From cb51fdc6f069f6877a76a2716c4b294cc7e01673 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: shenlei Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2026 11:44:56 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?feat(anti=5Ftamper):=20IGAntiTamper=E2=80=94?= =?UTF-8?q?=E2=80=94=E4=BA=8C=E8=BF=9B=E5=88=B6=E5=AE=8C=E6=95=B4=E6=80=A7?= =?UTF-8?q?/=E9=98=B2=E9=87=8D=E6=89=93=E5=8C=85=E6=8E=A2=E9=92=88?= =?UTF-8?q?=EF=BC=88cryptid+csops=EF=BC=89?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 补 anti_hook 只盯固定函数之外的空洞,正面反制 App Store 标准破解链 (脱壳解密→patch→重签): - FairPlay cryptid(reason=500):cryptid==0 或 LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO 被剥除=脱壳/重打包 - 代码签名 csops CS_OPS_STATUS(reason=501):CS_VALID 失效/ad-hoc 重签/分发包带 get-task-allow 误报底线:两条均按 expect_encrypted/expect_distribution 构建上下文开关, dev/诊断/TestFlight 传 0→UNAVAILABLE,绝不在非分发构建误报。作为独立探针 由 Swift 策略层/observer 带构建上下文单独调用,不并入 ig_defender_scan(不破坏现有签名)。 回归:tests/test_anti_tamper.py 合成 Mach-O 头跑 cryptid 核心五例(加密正常/脱壳/ 剥除/非分发跳过/NULL);模块接入 poison_host 与 device 链接列表。全量 73 过, iphoneos arm64 交叉编译通过。csops+真实主镜像验证待设备。docs/18 §7.7。 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 --- defender/anti_tamper/IGAntiTamper.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++ defender/anti_tamper/IGAntiTamper.h | 55 ++++++++++ defender/include/IGDefender.h | 4 + docs/18_READOOR_DEFENDER_INTEGRATION.md | 21 ++++ tests/fixtures/anti_tamper_host.c | 111 ++++++++++++++++++++ tests/test_anti_tamper.py | 38 +++++++ tests/test_poison_policy.py | 1 + tools/macho_guard/build_poison_device.py | 3 +- 8 files changed, 360 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 defender/anti_tamper/IGAntiTamper.c create mode 100644 defender/anti_tamper/IGAntiTamper.h create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/anti_tamper_host.c create mode 100644 tests/test_anti_tamper.py diff --git a/defender/anti_tamper/IGAntiTamper.c b/defender/anti_tamper/IGAntiTamper.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4b3b373 --- /dev/null +++ b/defender/anti_tamper/IGAntiTamper.c @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +/* + * IGAntiTamper.c — 二进制完整性 / 防重打包探针实现。见 .h 的定位与误报底线。 + * + * 只采集证据经 sink 上报,不处置。两条检查均按 expect_* 构建上下文开关,dev/诊断构建传 0 + * → 返回 UNAVAILABLE,绝不在非分发构建上报 DETECTED。 + */ +#include "IGAntiTamper.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +/* csops(2):读本进程代码签名状态。手工声明( 非 SDK 公共头)。 */ +#define IG_CS_OPS_STATUS 0 +#define IG_CS_VALID 0x00000001u /* 动态有效(代码页签名校验通过) */ +#define IG_CS_ADHOC 0x00000002u /* ad-hoc 签名(无开发者证书) */ +#define IG_CS_GET_TASK_ALLOW 0x00000004u /* 允许被 task_for_pid/调试器附着 */ +extern int csops(pid_t pid, unsigned int ops, void *useraddr, size_t usersize); + +static void ig_tamper_emit(IGFindingSink sink, void *ctx, int *hits, + IGStatus st, int reason, const char *subject, const char *evidence) { + IGFinding f; + __builtin_memset(&f, 0, sizeof(f)); + f.status = st; + f.reason = reason; + if (subject) snprintf(f.subject, sizeof(f.subject), "%s", subject); + if (evidence) snprintf(f.evidence, sizeof(f.evidence), "%s", evidence); + if (st == IG_DETECTED && hits) (*hits)++; + if (sink) sink(&f, ctx); +} + +int ig_tamper_scan_cryptid(const struct mach_header_64 *mh, int expect_encrypted, + IGFindingSink sink, void *ctx) { + int hits = 0; + + /* 非分发构建:未 FairPlay 加密是正常的,无法据此断言篡改。 */ + if (!expect_encrypted) { + ig_tamper_emit(sink, ctx, &hits, IG_UNAVAILABLE, IG_REASON_BINARY_DECRYPTED, + "cryptid", "非分发构建(expect_encrypted=0),跳过加密校验"); + return hits; + } + if (!mh || mh->magic != MH_MAGIC_64) { + ig_tamper_emit(sink, ctx, &hits, IG_UNAVAILABLE, IG_REASON_BINARY_DECRYPTED, + "cryptid", "主镜像 Mach-O 头不可用"); + return hits; + } + + /* 遍历 load command 找 LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO_64。 */ + const struct load_command *lc = (const struct load_command *)(mh + 1); + int found = 0; + uint32_t cryptid = 0; + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mh->ncmds; ++i) { + if (lc->cmdsize == 0) break; /* 防御畸形头导致的死循环 */ + if (lc->cmd == LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO_64) { + const struct encryption_info_command_64 *e = + (const struct encryption_info_command_64 *)lc; + found = 1; + cryptid = e->cryptid; + break; + } + lc = (const struct load_command *)((const uint8_t *)lc + lc->cmdsize); + } + + if (!found) { + /* 应加密的分发包却整条没有加密命令:被剥除/重打包的强信号。 */ + ig_tamper_emit(sink, ctx, &hits, IG_DETECTED, IG_REASON_BINARY_DECRYPTED, + "cryptid", "应加密分发包无 LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO(加密命令被剥除/重打包)"); + } else if (cryptid == 0) { + /* 标准脱壳(Clutch/frida-ios-dump)会把 cryptid 改 0。 */ + ig_tamper_emit(sink, ctx, &hits, IG_DETECTED, IG_REASON_BINARY_DECRYPTED, + "cryptid", "cryptid==0:二进制已脱壳解密(dump/重打包)"); + } + /* cryptid != 0 → CLEAR,保持安静不上报。 */ + return hits; +} + +static int ig_tamper_scan_codesign(int expect_distribution, + IGFindingSink sink, void *ctx) { + int hits = 0; + + /* 非分发构建:dev/诊断签名本就带 get-task-allow、可能 ad-hoc,不据此断言。 */ + if (!expect_distribution) { + ig_tamper_emit(sink, ctx, &hits, IG_UNAVAILABLE, IG_REASON_CODESIGN_INVALID, + "codesign", "非分发构建(expect_distribution=0),跳过签名校验"); + return hits; + } + + uint32_t status = 0; + if (csops(getpid(), IG_CS_OPS_STATUS, &status, sizeof(status)) != 0) { + ig_tamper_emit(sink, ctx, &hits, IG_UNAVAILABLE, IG_REASON_CODESIGN_INVALID, + "codesign", "csops(CS_OPS_STATUS) 调用失败"); + return hits; + } + + if (!(status & IG_CS_VALID)) { + ig_tamper_emit(sink, ctx, &hits, IG_DETECTED, IG_REASON_CODESIGN_INVALID, + "codesign", "CS_VALID 失效:代码页签名校验未通过(内存/磁盘被 patch)"); + } + if (status & IG_CS_ADHOC) { + ig_tamper_emit(sink, ctx, &hits, IG_DETECTED, IG_REASON_CODESIGN_INVALID, + "codesign", "ad-hoc 签名:无开发者证书的重签(典型破解重打包)"); + } + if (status & IG_CS_GET_TASK_ALLOW) { + ig_tamper_emit(sink, ctx, &hits, IG_DETECTED, IG_REASON_CODESIGN_INVALID, + "codesign", "分发包却带 get-task-allow:被重签成可调试"); + } + return hits; +} + +static const struct mach_header_64 *ig_main_image_header(void) { + uint32_t n = _dyld_image_count(); + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < n; ++i) { + const struct mach_header *h = _dyld_get_image_header(i); + if (h && h->magic == MH_MAGIC_64 && + ((const struct mach_header_64 *)h)->filetype == MH_EXECUTE) { + return (const struct mach_header_64 *)h; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +int ig_anti_tamper_check(int expect_encrypted, int expect_distribution, + IGFindingSink sink, void *ctx) { + int hits = 0; + hits += ig_tamper_scan_cryptid(ig_main_image_header(), expect_encrypted, sink, ctx); + hits += ig_tamper_scan_codesign(expect_distribution, sink, ctx); + return hits; +} diff --git a/defender/anti_tamper/IGAntiTamper.h b/defender/anti_tamper/IGAntiTamper.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..245fa79 --- /dev/null +++ b/defender/anti_tamper/IGAntiTamper.h @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * IGAntiTamper.h — 二进制完整性 / 防重打包探针。 + * + * 定位:anti_hook 只校验固定一批关键函数的序言/GOT——攻击者 patch 这批之外的任意指令(含 + * NOP 掉某条检测/毒化调用边、改业务层比较)它看不见。本模块从「镜像整体」角度补这个空洞, + * 正面反制 App Store 应用的标准破解链:**脱壳解密(Clutch/frida-ios-dump)→ patch → 重签**。 + * + * 两条检查(均只采集证据、不处置,经 sink 上报;判级交 policy): + * 1. FairPlay cryptid:App Store 分发包由 Apple 加密(LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO_64.cryptid=1)。 + * 脱壳 dump 会把 cryptid 改 0;重打包可能整条剥除加密命令。→ IG_REASON_BINARY_DECRYPTED。 + * 2. 代码签名状态(csops CS_OPS_STATUS):ad-hoc 重签、分发包却带 get-task-allow(被重签成 + * 可调试)、CS_VALID 失效。→ IG_REASON_CODESIGN_INVALID。 + * + * 【误报底线】这两条都**依赖构建上下文**:dev/TestFlight/诊断构建本就未 FairPlay 加密、且带 + * get-task-allow——那是正常的,不是篡改。故由调用方按构建类型传 expect_* 开关:只有 + * 「本应是 App Store 分发包」时才判 DETECTED;否则返回 UNAVAILABLE(无法断言,不上报 DETECTED)。 + * expect 开关应由 Release/App Store 构建配置注入(见 docs/18),绝不在 dev 构建置 1。 + * + * 【边界】csops 经 libc 调用,可被 hook 伪造(若攻击者已能 hook csops,说明环境已失陷, + * 届时 anti_hook/anti_inject 会先命中);cryptid 读的是进程内 Mach-O 头,patch 头部也能伪装, + * 但那要求攻击者已定位该检查——与整体「抬成本、非不可破」哲学一致,不作为唯一安全锚点。 + */ +#ifndef IG_ANTI_TAMPER_H +#define IG_ANTI_TAMPER_H + +#include + +#include "IGDefender.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * 真机入口:对当前进程主可执行镜像做 cryptid + 代码签名检查。 + * expect_encrypted:本构建是否「本应 FairPlay 加密」(App Store 分发=1,dev/诊断=0)。 + * expect_distribution:本构建是否「本应分发签名」(不含 get-task-allow;App Store=1,dev=0)。 + * 两者为 0 时对应检查返回 UNAVAILABLE(不误报)。返回 DETECTED 证据条数。 + */ +int ig_anti_tamper_check(int expect_encrypted, int expect_distribution, + IGFindingSink sink, void *ctx); + +/* + * 可测核心:对给定 Mach-O 头做 cryptid 检查(与真机入口共用逻辑,便于用合成头单测)。 + * mh:指向 mach_header_64。expect_encrypted:同上。 + * 返回 DETECTED 条数(0=CLEAR 或 UNAVAILABLE)。 + */ +int ig_tamper_scan_cryptid(const struct mach_header_64 *mh, int expect_encrypted, + IGFindingSink sink, void *ctx); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* IG_ANTI_TAMPER_H */ diff --git a/defender/include/IGDefender.h b/defender/include/IGDefender.h index 83ca2f6..7a84027 100644 --- a/defender/include/IGDefender.h +++ b/defender/include/IGDefender.h @@ -49,6 +49,10 @@ typedef enum { /* anti_jailbreak(4xx)——均走 IGSyscall 直发 svc,绕过 libc 层对 stat/access 的 hook */ IG_REASON_JAILBREAK_FILE = 400, /* 越狱特征文件/目录可访问(Cydia/Sileo/apt/substrate/var-jb…) */ IG_REASON_JAILBREAK_SANDBOX = 401, /* 能在 App 沙盒外创建文件:沙盒逃逸=越狱强信号 */ + /* anti_tamper(5xx)——二进制完整性/防重打包。正面反制「脱壳解密+patch+重签」破解链, + * 补 anti_hook 只盯固定函数之外的空洞。按构建上下文开关,dev/诊断构建不参与(UNAVAILABLE)。 */ + IG_REASON_BINARY_DECRYPTED = 500, /* 应加密的 App Store 包 cryptid==0 或 LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO 被剥除:脱壳/重打包强信号 */ + IG_REASON_CODESIGN_INVALID = 501, /* 代码签名异常:ad-hoc 重签 / 分发包却带 get-task-allow / CS_VALID 失效 */ } IGReason; typedef struct { diff --git a/docs/18_READOOR_DEFENDER_INTEGRATION.md b/docs/18_READOOR_DEFENDER_INTEGRATION.md index ff4330c..4443987 100644 --- a/docs/18_READOOR_DEFENDER_INTEGRATION.md +++ b/docs/18_READOOR_DEFENDER_INTEGRATION.md @@ -191,6 +191,27 @@ ig_poison_mix_key_inline(key, key_len); // 健康→key 不变→正常解密 > **仍未做**:调用点级别的间接跳转(`blr` + 运行期解析目标)——内联已消除热路径的调用边,间接跳转是针对「仍保留 out-of-line 入口」场景的额外一层,价值低于内联,按需再做。 +### 7.7 二进制完整性 / 防重打包探针(`IGAntiTamper`,本轮新增) + +**补的空洞**:`IGAntiHook` 只校验固定一批关键函数(~12 个 libc/系统符号)的序言/GOT——攻击者 patch 这批**之外**的任意指令(NOP 掉某条毒化调用边、改业务层比较)它看不见。`IGAntiTamper` 从「镜像整体」角度补位,正面反制 App Store 应用的标准破解链:**脱壳解密(Clutch/frida-ios-dump)→ patch → 重签**。 + +两条检查(`defender/anti_tamper/IGAntiTamper.{c,h}`,只采集证据经 sink 上报、不处置,判级交 policy): + +1. **FairPlay `cryptid`**(reason=500 `IG_REASON_BINARY_DECRYPTED`):App Store 分发包由 Apple 加密(`LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO_64.cryptid=1`)。脱壳 dump 会把 `cryptid` 改 0;重打包可能整条剥除加密命令。两种都判 DETECTED。 +2. **代码签名状态 `csops(CS_OPS_STATUS)`**(reason=501 `IG_REASON_CODESIGN_INVALID`):`CS_VALID` 失效(代码页被 patch)、`CS_ADHOC`(无开发者证书的重签)、分发包却带 `CS_GET_TASK_ALLOW`(被重签成可调试)。 + +**误报底线(关键)**:这两条都**依赖构建上下文**——dev/TestFlight/诊断构建本就未 FairPlay 加密、且带 get-task-allow,那是正常的、不是篡改。故入口 `ig_anti_tamper_check(int expect_encrypted, int expect_distribution, sink, ctx)` 由调用方按构建类型传 `expect_*` 开关: + +- **只有 App Store Release 构建传 `expect_encrypted=1, expect_distribution=1`**; +- dev/诊断/TestFlight 传 `0` → 对应检查返回 `UNAVAILABLE`(无法断言,不上报 DETECTED),**绝不在非分发构建误报**。 +- `expect_*` 应由 Release 构建配置(`#if` 宏或 xcconfig 注入),**绝不在 dev 构建硬编码为 1**。 + +**接线决策**:`IGAntiTamper` **不并入 `ig_defender_scan`**(那会改签名、破坏现有调用方),而作为**独立探针**由 Swift 策略层/observer 在带构建上下文开关处单独调用——与「灰度先 observer 打点」一致。首版建议只在 observer 阶段观察 500/501 的线上分布,确认 Release 包零 `UNAVAILABLE` 误触后再纳入处置。 + +**边界**:`csops` 经 libc,可被 hook 伪造(但攻击者若已能 hook csops,环境已失陷,anti_hook/anti_inject 会先命中);`cryptid` 读进程内 Mach-O 头,patch 头部也能伪装——与整体「抬成本、非不可破」哲学一致,不作唯一安全锚点。 + +回归:`tests/test_anti_tamper.py`(合成 Mach-O 头跑 cryptid 核心:加密正常/脱壳/剥除/非分发跳过/NULL 五例)。csops 与真实主镜像那部分由设备测试覆盖(待设备解锁)。 + --- ## 附录 A · 灰度第一步:observer 打点骨架(只观察,绝不处置) diff --git a/tests/fixtures/anti_tamper_host.c b/tests/fixtures/anti_tamper_host.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a295b58 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/anti_tamper_host.c @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +/* + * anti_tamper_host.c — IGAntiTamper cryptid 核心的宿主自测。 + * + * 用合成 Mach-O 头(header + 可选 LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO_64)驱动 ig_tamper_scan_cryptid, + * 覆盖四种情形:加密正常(cryptid=1)、脱壳(cryptid=0)、加密命令被剥除、非分发构建跳过。 + * 退出码 0 = 全部用例通过。不依赖真机(csops/真实镜像那部分由设备测试覆盖)。 + */ +#include "anti_tamper/IGAntiTamper.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +typedef struct { + int detected; /* DETECTED 条数 */ + int unavailable; /* UNAVAILABLE 条数 */ + int last_reason; /* 最后一条 DETECTED 的 reason */ +} Counter; + +static int sink(const IGFinding *f, void *ctx) { + Counter *c = (Counter *)ctx; + if (f->status == IG_DETECTED) { c->detected++; c->last_reason = f->reason; } + if (f->status == IG_UNAVAILABLE) { c->unavailable++; } + return 0; +} + +/* 构造一个带 ncmds 的最小 mach_header_64;commands 由调用方填好拼在后面。 */ +typedef struct { + struct mach_header_64 mh; + union { + struct encryption_info_command_64 enc; + unsigned char raw[256]; + } cmds; +} FakeImage; + +static void init_header(FakeImage *img, uint32_t ncmds, uint32_t sizeofcmds) { + memset(img, 0, sizeof(*img)); + img->mh.magic = MH_MAGIC_64; + img->mh.cputype = CPU_TYPE_ARM64; + img->mh.filetype = MH_EXECUTE; + img->mh.ncmds = ncmds; + img->mh.sizeofcmds = sizeofcmds; +} + +static int failures = 0; + +static void check(const char *name, int cond) { + if (!cond) { printf("FAIL: %s\n", name); failures++; } + else { printf("ok: %s\n", name); } +} + +int main(void) { + /* 1) cryptid=1:正常加密分发包 → CLEAR,不上报 DETECTED。 */ + { + FakeImage img; + init_header(&img, 1, sizeof(struct encryption_info_command_64)); + img.cmds.enc.cmd = LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO_64; + img.cmds.enc.cmdsize = sizeof(struct encryption_info_command_64); + img.cmds.enc.cryptid = 1; + Counter c = {0, 0, 0}; + int hits = ig_tamper_scan_cryptid(&img.mh, /*expect_encrypted=*/1, sink, &c); + check("cryptid=1 → 0 detected", hits == 0 && c.detected == 0); + } + + /* 2) cryptid=0:已脱壳 dump → DETECTED reason=500。 */ + { + FakeImage img; + init_header(&img, 1, sizeof(struct encryption_info_command_64)); + img.cmds.enc.cmd = LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO_64; + img.cmds.enc.cmdsize = sizeof(struct encryption_info_command_64); + img.cmds.enc.cryptid = 0; + Counter c = {0, 0, 0}; + int hits = ig_tamper_scan_cryptid(&img.mh, 1, sink, &c); + check("cryptid=0 → detected 500", + hits == 1 && c.detected == 1 && c.last_reason == IG_REASON_BINARY_DECRYPTED); + } + + /* 3) 无 LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO(加密命令被剥除)→ DETECTED reason=500。 */ + { + FakeImage img; + init_header(&img, 0, 0); /* 零条 load command */ + Counter c = {0, 0, 0}; + int hits = ig_tamper_scan_cryptid(&img.mh, 1, sink, &c); + check("no-enc-cmd → detected 500", + hits == 1 && c.detected == 1 && c.last_reason == IG_REASON_BINARY_DECRYPTED); + } + + /* 4) expect_encrypted=0:dev/诊断构建跳过 → UNAVAILABLE,无 DETECTED。 */ + { + FakeImage img; + init_header(&img, 1, sizeof(struct encryption_info_command_64)); + img.cmds.enc.cmd = LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO_64; + img.cmds.enc.cmdsize = sizeof(struct encryption_info_command_64); + img.cmds.enc.cryptid = 0; /* 即便 0,非分发构建也不判篡改 */ + Counter c = {0, 0, 0}; + int hits = ig_tamper_scan_cryptid(&img.mh, /*expect_encrypted=*/0, sink, &c); + check("expect_encrypted=0 → unavailable, 0 detected", + hits == 0 && c.detected == 0 && c.unavailable == 1); + } + + /* 5) NULL 头 + expect=1 → UNAVAILABLE(不崩、不误报)。 */ + { + Counter c = {0, 0, 0}; + int hits = ig_tamper_scan_cryptid(NULL, 1, sink, &c); + check("null header → unavailable, 0 detected", + hits == 0 && c.detected == 0 && c.unavailable == 1); + } + + printf("%s (%d failures)\n", failures ? "FAILED" : "PASSED", failures); + return failures ? 1 : 0; +} diff --git a/tests/test_anti_tamper.py b/tests/test_anti_tamper.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7cd6c4e --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_anti_tamper.py @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +"""IGAntiTamper 宿主自测:cryptid 核心逻辑(合成 Mach-O 头)。 + +真机的 csops 代码签名检查与真实主镜像 cryptid 由设备测试覆盖;此处固化可复现的 +cryptid 判定基线(加密正常/脱壳/剥除/非分发跳过/NULL),退出码 0 = 全过。 +""" +from pathlib import Path +import os +import shutil +import subprocess +import sys +import tempfile +import unittest + +ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +SOURCES = ['anti_tamper/IGAntiTamper.c'] + + +@unittest.skipUnless(sys.platform == 'darwin' and shutil.which('xcrun'), '需要 Xcode/macOS') +class AntiTamperCryptidTests(unittest.TestCase): + def test_cryptid_core(self): + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d: + exe = Path(d) / 'anti-tamper-host' + env = dict(os.environ) + env.pop('DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES', None) + args = ['xcrun', '--sdk', 'macosx', 'clang', '-O2', + '-I', str(ROOT / 'defender/include'), '-I', str(ROOT / 'defender'), + str(ROOT / 'tests/fixtures/anti_tamper_host.c'), + *(str(ROOT / 'defender' / p) for p in SOURCES), + '-o', str(exe)] + build = subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, text=True, env=env) + self.assertEqual(build.returncode, 0, build.stdout + build.stderr) + run = subprocess.run([str(exe)], capture_output=True, text=True, env=env) + self.assertEqual(run.returncode, 0, run.stdout + run.stderr) + self.assertIn('PASSED', run.stdout) + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_poison_policy.py b/tests/test_poison_policy.py index 8a20406..d789173 100644 --- a/tests/test_poison_policy.py +++ b/tests/test_poison_policy.py @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ SOURCES = [ 'anti_frida/IGAntiInject.c', 'anti_debug/IGAntiDebug.c', 'resolve/IGResolve.c', 'dispatch/IGDispatch.c', 'dispatch/IGArchiveGuard.c', 'call_bridge/IGFileBridge.c', + 'anti_tamper/IGAntiTamper.c', ] diff --git a/tools/macho_guard/build_poison_device.py b/tools/macho_guard/build_poison_device.py index 625b18e..5d12cb1 100755 --- a/tools/macho_guard/build_poison_device.py +++ b/tools/macho_guard/build_poison_device.py @@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ def build(profile, identity, bundle, output): 'IGDefender.c', 'anti_hook/IGAntiHook.c', 'anti_hook/IGObjCBaseline.c', 'anti_frida/IGAntiInject.c', 'anti_debug/IGAntiDebug.c', 'resolve/IGResolve.c', 'dispatch/IGDispatch.c', - 'dispatch/IGArchiveGuard.c', 'call_bridge/IGFileBridge.c'] + 'dispatch/IGArchiveGuard.c', 'call_bridge/IGFileBridge.c', + 'anti_tamper/IGAntiTamper.c'] objects = [] for i, module in enumerate(modules): obj = output / f'{i}.o'