port 2P step 1: vendor CPython 2.7.18 as the mtpython static library

The embedded 40250 script layer needs its own interpreter on five platforms. 2.7 is end-of-life, so nothing can be fetched from the target SDKs and the source is vendored (official 2.7.18 tarball, trimmed to 25MB; Lib/ stays for step 3's python27.zip). cpython-2.7.18/CMakeLists.txt builds one `mtpython` static library from exactly the 133 objects the reference libpython2.7.a contains, off by default behind -DMTGODOT_EMBED_PYTHON=ON. The source list and the built-in module table (config/config.c, 39 entries) are shared; pyconfig.h is a probe result and is not, so each platform keeps its own under config/<platform>/, regenerated by tools/py_embed/gen_pyconfig.sh and checked against the shared table. Three vendor patches, documented in docs/THIRD-PARTY.md: configure/configure.ac learn arm64 on macOS, and posixmodule.c undefines the process-control calls it hard-defines past pyconfig.h when building for iOS. macOS (ctest python.embed: every builtin imports, codecs and pickle work off the vendored Lib/), Android arm64 and iOS arm64 build. Linux needs a Linux host and Windows needs a MinGW-vs-MSVC decision; both are noted for step 4. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 08:27:35 +09:00
parent a9b31dec67
commit 5fad769ee8
1018 changed files with 652582 additions and 19 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+#include "Python.h"
+#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
+#include <windows.h>
+#else
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H) && (defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) || defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY))
+#include <sys/random.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef Py_DEBUG
+int _Py_HashSecret_Initialized = 0;
+#else
+static int _Py_HashSecret_Initialized = 0;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
+typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXTA)(HCRYPTPROV *phProv,\
+              LPCSTR pszContainer, LPCSTR pszProvider, DWORD dwProvType,\
+              DWORD dwFlags );
+typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CRYPTGENRANDOM)(HCRYPTPROV hProv, DWORD dwLen,\
+              BYTE *pbBuffer );
+
+static CRYPTGENRANDOM pCryptGenRandom = NULL;
+/* This handle is never explicitly released. Instead, the operating
+   system will release it when the process terminates. */
+static HCRYPTPROV hCryptProv = 0;
+
+static int
+win32_urandom_init(int raise)
+{
+    HINSTANCE hAdvAPI32 = NULL;
+    CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXTA pCryptAcquireContext = NULL;
+
+    /* Obtain handle to the DLL containing CryptoAPI. This should not fail. */
+    hAdvAPI32 = GetModuleHandle("advapi32.dll");
+    if(hAdvAPI32 == NULL)
+        goto error;
+
+    /* Obtain pointers to the CryptoAPI functions. This will fail on some early
+       versions of Win95. */
+    pCryptAcquireContext = (CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXTA)GetProcAddress(
+                               hAdvAPI32, "CryptAcquireContextA");
+    if (pCryptAcquireContext == NULL)
+        goto error;
+
+    pCryptGenRandom = (CRYPTGENRANDOM)GetProcAddress(hAdvAPI32,
+                                                     "CryptGenRandom");
+    if (pCryptGenRandom == NULL)
+        goto error;
+
+    /* Acquire context */
+    if (! pCryptAcquireContext(&hCryptProv, NULL, NULL,
+                               PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT))
+        goto error;
+
+    return 0;
+
+error:
+    if (raise)
+        PyErr_SetFromWindowsErr(0);
+    else
+        Py_FatalError("Failed to initialize Windows random API (CryptoGen)");
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/* Fill buffer with size pseudo-random bytes generated by the Windows CryptoGen
+   API. Return 0 on success, or -1 on error. */
+static int
+win32_urandom(unsigned char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int raise)
+{
+    Py_ssize_t chunk;
+
+    if (hCryptProv == 0)
+    {
+        if (win32_urandom_init(raise) == -1)
+            return -1;
+    }
+
+    while (size > 0)
+    {
+        chunk = size > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : size;
+        if (!pCryptGenRandom(hCryptProv, chunk, buffer))
+        {
+            /* CryptGenRandom() failed */
+            if (raise)
+                PyErr_SetFromWindowsErr(0);
+            else
+                Py_FatalError("Failed to initialized the randomized hash "
+                        "secret using CryptoGen)");
+            return -1;
+        }
+        buffer += chunk;
+        size -= chunk;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Issue #25003: Don't use getentropy() on Solaris (available since
+   Solaris 11.3), it is blocking whereas os.urandom() should not block.
+
+   Issue #29188: Don't use getentropy() on Linux since the glibc 2.24
+   implements it with the getrandom() syscall which can fail with ENOSYS,
+   and this error is not supported in py_getentropy() and getrandom() is called
+   with flags=0 which blocks until system urandom is initialized, which is not
+   the desired behaviour to seed the Python hash secret nor for os.urandom():
+   see the PEP 524 which was only implemented in Python 3.6. */
+#elif defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY) && !defined(sun) && !defined(linux)
+#define PY_GETENTROPY 1
+
+/* Fill buffer with size pseudo-random bytes generated by getentropy().
+   Return 0 on success, or raise an exception and return -1 on error.
+   If fatal is nonzero, call Py_FatalError() instead of raising an exception
+   on error. */
+static int
+py_getentropy(unsigned char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int fatal)
+{
+    while (size > 0) {
+        Py_ssize_t len = size < 256 ? size : 256;
+        int res;
+
+        if (!fatal) {
+            Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
+            res = getentropy(buffer, len);
+            Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS
+
+            if (res < 0) {
+                PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError);
+                return -1;
+            }
+        }
+        else {
+            res = getentropy(buffer, len);
+            if (res < 0)
+                Py_FatalError("getentropy() failed");
+        }
+
+        buffer += len;
+        size -= len;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __VMS
+/* Use openssl random routine */
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+static int
+vms_urandom(unsigned char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int raise)
+{
+    if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(buffer, size) < 0) {
+        if (raise) {
+            PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError,
+                         "RAND_pseudo_bytes");
+        } else {
+            Py_FatalError("Failed to initialize the randomized hash "
+                          "secret using RAND_pseudo_bytes");
+        }
+        return -1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* __VMS */
+
+
+#if !defined(MS_WINDOWS) && !defined(__VMS)
+
+static struct {
+    int fd;
+    dev_t st_dev;
+    ino_t st_ino;
+} urandom_cache = { -1 };
+
+/* Read size bytes from /dev/urandom into buffer.
+   Call Py_FatalError() on error. */
+static void
+dev_urandom_noraise(unsigned char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size)
+{
+    int fd;
+    Py_ssize_t n;
+
+    assert (0 < size);
+
+    fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+    if (fd < 0)
+        Py_FatalError("Failed to open /dev/urandom");
+
+    while (0 < size)
+    {
+        do {
+            n = read(fd, buffer, (size_t)size);
+        } while (n < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+        if (n <= 0)
+        {
+            /* stop on error or if read(size) returned 0 */
+            Py_FatalError("Failed to read bytes from /dev/urandom");
+            break;
+        }
+        buffer += n;
+        size -= (Py_ssize_t)n;
+    }
+    close(fd);
+}
+
+/* Read size bytes from /dev/urandom into buffer.
+   Return 0 on success, raise an exception and return -1 on error. */
+static int
+dev_urandom_python(char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size)
+{
+    int fd;
+    Py_ssize_t n;
+    struct stat st;
+    int attr;
+
+    if (size <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0) {
+        /* Does the fd point to the same thing as before? (issue #21207) */
+        if (fstat(urandom_cache.fd, &st)
+            || st.st_dev != urandom_cache.st_dev
+            || st.st_ino != urandom_cache.st_ino) {
+            /* Something changed: forget the cached fd (but don't close it,
+               since it probably points to something important for some
+               third-party code). */
+            urandom_cache.fd = -1;
+        }
+    }
+    if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0)
+        fd = urandom_cache.fd;
+    else {
+        Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
+        fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+        Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS
+        if (fd < 0)
+        {
+            if (errno == ENOENT || errno == ENXIO ||
+                errno == ENODEV || errno == EACCES)
+                PyErr_SetString(PyExc_NotImplementedError,
+                                "/dev/urandom (or equivalent) not found");
+            else
+                PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError);
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        /* try to make the file descriptor non-inheritable, ignore errors */
+        attr = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD);
+        if (attr >= 0) {
+            attr |= FD_CLOEXEC;
+            (void)fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, attr);
+        }
+
+        if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0) {
+            /* urandom_fd was initialized by another thread while we were
+               not holding the GIL, keep it. */
+            close(fd);
+            fd = urandom_cache.fd;
+        }
+        else {
+            if (fstat(fd, &st)) {
+                PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError);
+                close(fd);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            else {
+                urandom_cache.fd = fd;
+                urandom_cache.st_dev = st.st_dev;
+                urandom_cache.st_ino = st.st_ino;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
+    do {
+        do {
+            n = read(fd, buffer, (size_t)size);
+        } while (n < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+        if (n <= 0)
+            break;
+        buffer += n;
+        size -= (Py_ssize_t)n;
+    } while (0 < size);
+    Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS
+
+    if (n <= 0)
+    {
+        /* stop on error or if read(size) returned 0 */
+        if (n < 0)
+            PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError);
+        else
+            PyErr_Format(PyExc_RuntimeError,
+                         "Failed to read %zi bytes from /dev/urandom",
+                         size);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+dev_urandom_close(void)
+{
+    if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0) {
+        close(urandom_cache.fd);
+        urandom_cache.fd = -1;
+    }
+}
+
+
+#endif /* !defined(MS_WINDOWS) && !defined(__VMS) */
+
+/* Fill buffer with pseudo-random bytes generated by a linear congruent
+   generator (LCG):
+
+       x(n+1) = (x(n) * 214013 + 2531011) % 2^32
+
+   Use bits 23..16 of x(n) to generate a byte. */
+static void
+lcg_urandom(unsigned int x0, unsigned char *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+    size_t index;
+    unsigned int x;
+
+    x = x0;
+    for (index=0; index < size; index++) {
+        x *= 214013;
+        x += 2531011;
+        /* modulo 2 ^ (8 * sizeof(int)) */
+        buffer[index] = (x >> 16) & 0xff;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Fill buffer with size pseudo-random bytes from the operating system random
+   number generator (RNG). It is suitable for most cryptographic purposes
+   except long living private keys for asymmetric encryption.
+
+   Return 0 on success, raise an exception and return -1 on error. */
+int
+_PyOS_URandom(void *buffer, Py_ssize_t size)
+{
+    if (size < 0) {
+        PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError,
+                     "negative argument not allowed");
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (size == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
+    return win32_urandom((unsigned char *)buffer, size, 1);
+#elif defined(PY_GETENTROPY)
+    return py_getentropy(buffer, size, 0);
+#else
+# ifdef __VMS
+    return vms_urandom((unsigned char *)buffer, size, 1);
+# else
+    return dev_urandom_python((char*)buffer, size);
+# endif
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+_PyRandom_Init(void)
+{
+    char *env;
+    void *secret = &_Py_HashSecret;
+    Py_ssize_t secret_size = sizeof(_Py_HashSecret_t);
+
+    if (_Py_HashSecret_Initialized)
+        return;
+    _Py_HashSecret_Initialized = 1;
+
+    /*
+      By default, hash randomization is disabled, and only
+      enabled if PYTHONHASHSEED is set to non-empty or if
+      "-R" is provided at the command line:
+    */
+    if (!Py_HashRandomizationFlag) {
+        /* Disable the randomized hash: */
+        memset(secret, 0, secret_size);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    /*
+      Hash randomization is enabled.  Generate a per-process secret,
+      using PYTHONHASHSEED if provided.
+    */
+
+    env = Py_GETENV("PYTHONHASHSEED");
+    if (env && *env != '\0' && strcmp(env, "random") != 0) {
+        char *endptr = env;
+        unsigned long seed;
+        seed = strtoul(env, &endptr, 10);
+        if (*endptr != '\0'
+            || seed > 4294967295UL
+            || (errno == ERANGE && seed == ULONG_MAX))
+        {
+            Py_FatalError("PYTHONHASHSEED must be \"random\" or an integer "
+                          "in range [0; 4294967295]");
+        }
+        if (seed == 0) {
+            /* disable the randomized hash */
+            memset(secret, 0, secret_size);
+        }
+        else {
+            lcg_urandom(seed, (unsigned char*)secret, secret_size);
+        }
+    }
+    else {
+#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
+        (void)win32_urandom((unsigned char *)secret, secret_size, 0);
+#elif __VMS
+        vms_urandom((unsigned char *)secret, secret_size, 0);
+#elif defined(PY_GETENTROPY)
+        (void)py_getentropy(secret, secret_size, 1);
+#else
+        dev_urandom_noraise(secret, secret_size);
+#endif
+    }
+}
+
+void
+_PyRandom_Fini(void)
+{
+#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
+    if (hCryptProv) {
+        CryptReleaseContext(hCryptProv, 0);
+        hCryptProv = 0;
+    }
+#elif defined(PY_GETENTROPY)
+    /* nothing to clean */
+#else
+    dev_urandom_close();
+#endif
+}