test(defender): 处置链真机验证诊断进程 + 构建/执行器(step12)

补齐 docs/19 的真机 harness,交叉编译通过(iphoneos arm64),待设备执行。

- tests/fixtures/poison_device.m:真机诊断进程。D4–D7 环境无关不变量
  (apply恒等/mark坏key/构造期mask=0/策略分级)输出 IG_POISON_CASE 作套件门槛;
  D1–D3 环境相关(聚合扫描/越狱文件400/沙盒逃逸401)输出 OBS + IG_POISON_ENV
  环境判定,供 R/J 组对照判定。只被动探测,不自造越狱文件,每例 ig_poison_init 复位。
- tools/macho_guard/build_poison_device.py:照 hook 版,模块含 poison/policy/
  anti_jailbreak,专用 Bundle 前缀 poisonpilot、通配开发 profile 校验、源码快照哈希。
- tools/macho_guard/run_poison_device.py:单相位安装→启动→卸载→证据哈希;
  --expect clean|jailbroken 自动校验 R 组 jailbroken=no / J 组命中 400/401。
- docs/19 §2/§3/§6 更新为“已建、交叉编译通过、待真机执行”。

全套 63 项宿主/工具测试通过。

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
shenlei
2026-11-12 22:43:03 +09:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent c4c9a6925a
commit 3503a24bd4
4 changed files with 446 additions and 8 deletions
@@ -26,7 +26,11 @@
## 2. 诊断进程(复用 docs/17 harness 模式)
新增 fixture `tests/fixtures/poison_device.m`(**待建**,模式沿用 `hook_device.m`),在自身进程内按用例运行**真实探针链**,逐条 `NSLog` 证据 + 汇总 PASS/FAIL。构建/执行器复用 `tools/macho_guard/build_*_device.py` / `run_*_device.py` 的「安装→运行→卸载→证据哈希」骨架。
诊断进程 `tests/fixtures/poison_device.m`(**已建**,模式沿用 `hook_device.m`),在自身进程内按用例运行**真实探针链**,逐条 `NSLog` 证据 + 汇总。构建/执行器为 `tools/macho_guard/build_poison_device.py` / `run_poison_device.py`,复用 docs/17 的「安装→运行→卸载→证据哈希」骨架;已交叉编译通过(iphoneos arm64,符号全解析),待真机执行。
输出分两类(见下表):
- **`IG_POISON_CASE`**:环境无关不变量(D4–D7),构成套件 PASS/FAIL 门槛,两组都必须过。
- **`IG_POISON_OBS` / `IG_POISON_ENV`**:环境相关观察(D1–D3 + 越狱判定),不写死 PASS/FAIL;由 runner 的 `--expect clean|jailbroken` 按 R/J 组校验(R 应 `jailbroken=no`、J 应 `jailbroken=yes`)。
**关键:攻击/构造代码只存在于诊断源码,绝不编入业务库。** 越狱特征文件的「存在性」在 J 组由设备本身提供(真有 `/var/jb`、Cydia 等),诊断进程只做被动探测,不自己造越狱文件。
@@ -55,19 +59,25 @@ python3 tools/macho_guard/build_poison_device.py \
--bundle-id cn.touchv.iosguard.poisonpilot.<date> \
--output test-results/step12-device-poison/build-<date>
# R 组(非越狱真机)
# R 组(非越狱真机):--expect clean 自动校验 jailbroken=no
python3 tools/macho_guard/run_poison_device.py \
--device <UDID_非越狱> --app .../IGPoisonPilot.app \
--device <UDID_非越狱> --expect clean \
--app test-results/step12-device-poison/build-<date>/IGPoisonPilot.app \
--bundle-id cn.touchv.iosguard.poisonpilot.<date> \
--output test-results/step12-device-poison/<date>-R
# J 组(越狱设备)
# J 组(越狱设备):--expect jailbroken 自动校验命中 400/401
python3 tools/macho_guard/run_poison_device.py \
--device <UDID_越狱> --app .../IGPoisonPilot.app \
--device <UDID_越狱> --expect jailbroken \
--app test-results/step12-device-poison/build-<date>/IGPoisonPilot.app \
--bundle-id cn.touchv.iosguard.poisonpilot.<date> \
--output test-results/step12-device-poison/<date>-J
```
runner 退出码:D4–D7 不变量全过 **且** 环境判定与 `--expect` 一致 → 0,否则 1。证据:
`device-verification.json`(verdict/不变量用例/观察/环境判定/边界)、`console.log`(逐条 finding)、
`install/launch/uninstall.json`、`evidence-hashes.json`;构建侧 `manifest.json` 含源码快照哈希。
证据产物(对齐 docs/17 口径):`device-verification.json`(用例/结论/边界)、`console-*.log`(逐条 finding)、`evidence-hashes.json`、构建侧 `manifest.json`(源码快照哈希)。
---
@@ -97,7 +107,7 @@ python3 tools/macho_guard/run_poison_device.py \
## 6. 当前进度
- [x] 宿主闭环基线固化并绿灯:`tests/fixtures/poison_host.c` + `tests/test_poison_policy.py`(19/19:poison 7 + policy 8 + jailbreak 4)。
- [ ] `poison_device.m` + `build/run_poison_device.py`(复用 docs/17 harness)。
- [ ] R 组(非越狱真机)跑 D1–D7,达标 §4.1。
- [ ] J 组(越狱设备)跑 D1–D7,达标 §4.2,分「裸越狱 / 带 bypass」两档记录。
- [x] `poison_device.m` + `build_poison_device.py` + `run_poison_device.py`(复用 docs/17 harness);交叉编译通过(iphoneos arm64),待真机执行。
- [ ] R 组(非越狱真机)跑 D1–D7,`--expect clean`,达标 §4.1。
- [ ] J 组(越狱设备)跑 D1–D7,`--expect jailbroken`,达标 §4.2,分「裸越狱 / 带 bypass」两档记录。
- [ ] 达标后进入 docs/18 §5 灰度(observer 打点 → 开毒化)。
+176
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@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
/*
* poison_device.m — 处置链真机验证诊断进程(step12,见 docs/19)。
*
* 在真机自身进程内运行真实的「检测→分级→数据毒化」链,分两类用例:
*
* A. 环境无关不变量(两组设备都必须 PASS,构成套件门槛):
* D4 poison_identity 健康态 apply 恒等(out==key)——证不误伤解密
* D5 poison_mark_corrupt mark 后 apply 坏 key(out!=key)——证毒化真的生效
* D6 ctor_clean_start 进程启动未 mark 时 mask==0——证构造期初始化干净、无启动即毒化
* D7 policy_grades 合成 finding 复核分级(弱/单MEDIUM不触发;双MEDIUM/单STRONG触发)
*
* B. 环境相关观察(不写死 PASS/FAIL,输出命中供人按 R/J 组判定,见 docs/19 §4):
* D1 baseline_scan ig_policy_scan_and_mark(bundle) 的返回/mask
* D2 jb_file 内置越狱特征表 access 直发命中数(reason=400)
* D3 jb_sandbox 默认沙盒逃逸探测(reason=401)
* 并据 D2/D3 是否命中输出环境判定 IG_POISON_ENV jailbroken=yes|no。
*
* 边界:攻击/构造代码只存在于本诊断源码,绝不编入业务库;越狱特征文件的“存在性”
* 在 J 组由设备本身提供,诊断进程只做被动 access/open 探测,不自己造越狱文件。
* 每例结束前调 ig_poison_init() 复位,避免跨例污染。
*/
#import <Foundation/Foundation.h>
#include "IGDefender.h"
#include "poison/IGPoison.h"
#include "policy/IGPolicy.h"
#include "anti_jailbreak/IGAntiJailbreak.h"
#include <string.h>
/* ---------- 发现收集 ---------- */
#define IG_MAXF 64
static IGFinding g_f[IG_MAXF];
static int g_nf;
static int g_detected;
static int collect(const IGFinding *f, void *ctx) {
(void)ctx;
if (f->status == IG_DETECTED) {
if (g_nf < IG_MAXF) g_f[g_nf++] = *f;
g_detected++;
}
NSLog(@"IG_POISON_FINDING status=%d reason=%d subject=%s evidence=%s",
f->status, f->reason, f->subject, f->evidence);
return 0;
}
static void reset_findings(void) { g_nf = 0; g_detected = 0; }
static int count_reason(int reason) {
int n = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < g_nf; ++i) if (g_f[i].reason == reason) n++;
return n;
}
/* ---------- PASS/FAIL 汇总 ---------- */
static int g_pass = 0, g_fail = 0;
static void mark_case(const char *name, int pass, const char *detail) {
if (pass) g_pass++; else g_fail++;
NSLog(@"IG_POISON_CASE %s %s detail=%s", name, pass ? "PASS" : "FAIL", detail ? detail : "");
}
static void observe(const char *name, const char *detail) {
NSLog(@"IG_POISON_OBS %s %s", name, detail ? detail : "");
}
/* ---------- policy 合成输入 ---------- */
static void feed(IGPolicyState *st, IGStatus status, int reason) {
IGFinding f; memset(&f, 0, sizeof(f));
f.status = status; f.reason = reason;
ig_policy_sink(&f, st);
}
static int run_policy_weak(void) {
ig_poison_init();
IGPolicyState st; ig_policy_reset(&st, NULL, NULL);
feed(&st, IG_DETECTED, IG_REASON_FOREIGN_IMAGE);
feed(&st, IG_DETECTED, IG_REASON_FRIDA_PORT);
return ig_policy_evaluate_and_mark(&st);
}
static int run_policy_single_medium(void) {
ig_poison_init();
IGPolicyState st; ig_policy_reset(&st, NULL, NULL);
feed(&st, IG_DETECTED, IG_REASON_OBJC_IMP_CHANGED);
return ig_policy_evaluate_and_mark(&st);
}
static int run_policy_two_medium(void) {
ig_poison_init();
IGPolicyState st; ig_policy_reset(&st, NULL, NULL);
feed(&st, IG_DETECTED, IG_REASON_OBJC_IMP_CHANGED);
feed(&st, IG_DETECTED, IG_REASON_SYMBOL_PROVENANCE);
return ig_policy_evaluate_and_mark(&st);
}
static int run_policy_single_strong(void) {
ig_poison_init();
IGPolicyState st; ig_policy_reset(&st, NULL, NULL);
feed(&st, IG_DETECTED, IG_REASON_JAILBREAK_SANDBOX);
return ig_policy_evaluate_and_mark(&st);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
(void)argc; (void)argv;
@autoreleasepool {
const char *bundle = [[[NSBundle mainBundle] bundlePath] fileSystemRepresentation];
/* ===== D6 ctor_clean_start:进程启动早期、任何 mark 之前,mask 必须为 0 =====
* 放最前,尽量贴近启动态(构造器已跑,但本进程尚未触发任何检测/mark)。 */
{
uint64_t m = ig_poison_mask();
char d[64]; snprintf(d, sizeof(d), "mask=0x%llx", (unsigned long long)m);
mark_case("ctor_clean_start", m == 0, d);
}
/* ===== D4 poison_identity:健康态 apply 恒等 ===== */
{
ig_poison_init();
const uint8_t key[] = { 's','t','a','r','t','i','a','s','o','f','t',0x11,0x22 };
size_t n = sizeof(key); uint8_t out[sizeof(key)];
memset(out, 0xAB, n);
ig_poison_apply(key, out, n);
mark_case("poison_identity", memcmp(out, key, n) == 0, "healthy apply must be identity");
}
/* ===== D5 poison_mark_corrupt:mark 后 apply 坏 key ===== */
{
ig_poison_init();
const uint8_t key[] = { 's','t','a','r','t','i','a','s','o','f','t',0x11,0x22 };
size_t n = sizeof(key); uint8_t out[sizeof(key)];
ig_poison_mark(0xC0FFEE);
int nonzero = (ig_poison_mask() != 0);
ig_poison_apply(key, out, n);
int corrupted = (memcmp(out, key, n) != 0);
mark_case("poison_mark_corrupt", nonzero && corrupted, "marked apply must differ");
ig_poison_init();
}
/* ===== D7 policy_grades:真机复核分级 ===== */
{
int weak = run_policy_weak(); /* 期望 0 */
int med1 = run_policy_single_medium(); /* 期望 0 */
int med2 = run_policy_two_medium(); /* 期望 1 */
int strong = run_policy_single_strong(); /* 期望 1 */
int ok = (weak == 0 && med1 == 0 && med2 == 1 && strong == 1);
char d[96];
snprintf(d, sizeof(d), "weak=%d single_medium=%d two_medium=%d single_strong=%d",
weak, med1, med2, strong);
mark_case("policy_grades", ok, d);
ig_poison_init();
}
/* ===== D2 jb_file(观察):内置越狱特征表直发 access ===== */
reset_findings();
ig_anti_jb_check(collect, NULL);
int hit400 = count_reason(IG_REASON_JAILBREAK_FILE);
int hit401_default = count_reason(IG_REASON_JAILBREAK_SANDBOX);
{
char d[96]; snprintf(d, sizeof(d), "reason400=%d reason401=%d", hit400, hit401_default);
observe("jb_file", d);
}
/* ===== D1 baseline_scan(观察):聚合策略扫描的返回与 mask ===== */
{
ig_poison_init();
int triggered = ig_policy_scan_and_mark(bundle, 0, NULL, NULL);
uint64_t m = ig_poison_mask();
char d[96]; snprintf(d, sizeof(d), "triggered=%d mask=0x%llx",
triggered, (unsigned long long)m);
observe("baseline_scan", d);
ig_poison_init();
}
/* ===== 环境判定:D2/D3 任一命中即视作越狱环境(J 组)===== */
int jailbroken = (hit400 > 0) || (hit401_default > 0);
NSLog(@"IG_POISON_ENV jailbroken=%s reason400=%d reason401=%d",
jailbroken ? "yes" : "no", hit400, hit401_default);
/* 套件判定只看环境无关不变量(D4–D7)。 */
NSLog(@"IG_POISON_SUITE %s pass=%d fail=%d", g_fail ? "FAIL" : "PASS", g_pass, g_fail);
}
return 0;
}
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@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""构建处置链真机验证诊断 App(step12,见 docs/19)。
验证 poison/policy/anti_jailbreak 这条「检测→分级→数据毒化」链在真机的行为。
只支持匹配的 wildcard 开发 profile,专用 Bundle ID 前缀避免复用业务标识;
构建后不安装、不更新开发者门户。诊断进程只被动探测,不含注入/攻击构造 dylib。
"""
import argparse
import datetime
import hashlib
import json
from pathlib import Path
import plistlib
import shutil
import subprocess
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
BUNDLE_PREFIX = 'cn.touchv.iosguard.poisonpilot.'
def command(args, log: Path, label: str):
r = subprocess.run(list(map(str, args)), capture_output=True, text=True)
with log.open('a') as f:
f.write(f'== {label} ==\n' + json.dumps(list(map(str, args))) + '\n'
+ r.stdout + r.stderr + f'\nexit={r.returncode}\n')
if r.returncode:
raise RuntimeError(f'{label} 失败,详见 build.log')
return r
def build(profile, identity, bundle, output):
output = output.resolve()
if output.exists():
raise ValueError('输出目录必须不存在')
r = subprocess.run(['openssl', 'smime', '-inform', 'der', '-verify', '-noverify',
'-in', str(profile)], capture_output=True, check=True)
data = plistlib.loads(r.stdout)
ent = data['Entitlements']
team = data['TeamIdentifier'][0]
prefix = data['ApplicationIdentifierPrefix'][0]
if ent['application-identifier'] != prefix + '.*' or not ent.get('get-task-allow'):
raise ValueError('需要通配开发 profile,避免复用现有业务 Bundle ID')
if data['ExpirationDate'] <= datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc).replace(tzinfo=None):
raise ValueError('profile 已过期')
if identity.upper() not in {hashlib.sha1(c).hexdigest().upper()
for c in data['DeveloperCertificates']}:
raise ValueError('identity 不属于指定 profile')
if not bundle.startswith(BUNDLE_PREFIX):
raise ValueError(f'诊断 Bundle ID 必须使用专用前缀 {BUNDLE_PREFIX}')
output.mkdir(parents=True)
blog = output / 'build.log'
source = output / 'source-snapshot'
inputs = [*list((ROOT / 'defender').rglob('*.c')),
*list((ROOT / 'defender').rglob('*.h')),
ROOT / 'tests/fixtures/poison_device.m',
Path(__file__)]
hashes = {}
for p in inputs:
dest = source / p.relative_to(ROOT)
dest.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
shutil.copy2(p, dest)
hashes[str(p.relative_to(ROOT))] = hashlib.sha256(p.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
app = output / 'IGPoisonPilot.app'
app.mkdir()
info = dict(CFBundleExecutable='IGPoisonPilot', CFBundleIdentifier=bundle,
CFBundleName='IGPoisonPilot', CFBundleDisplayName='IG Poison Test',
CFBundlePackageType='APPL', CFBundleVersion='1',
CFBundleShortVersionString='1.0', MinimumOSVersion='15.0',
LSRequiresIPhoneOS=True, UIDeviceFamily=[1, 2], UILaunchScreen={})
(app / 'Info.plist').write_bytes(plistlib.dumps(info))
common = ['xcrun', '--sdk', 'iphoneos', 'clang', '-arch', 'arm64',
'-miphoneos-version-min=15.0', '-O2',
'-I', source / 'defender', '-I', source / 'defender/include']
# 处置链 + 其依赖的聚合扫描全套模块(ig_policy_scan_and_mark → ig_defender_scan)。
modules = ['poison/IGPoison.c', 'policy/IGPolicy.c',
'anti_jailbreak/IGAntiJailbreak.c', 'syscall/IGSyscall.c',
'IGDefender.c', 'anti_hook/IGAntiHook.c', 'anti_hook/IGObjCBaseline.c',
'anti_frida/IGAntiInject.c', 'anti_debug/IGAntiDebug.c',
'resolve/IGResolve.c', 'dispatch/IGDispatch.c',
'dispatch/IGArchiveGuard.c', 'call_bridge/IGFileBridge.c']
objects = []
for i, module in enumerate(modules):
obj = output / f'{i}.o'
command(common + ['-c', source / 'defender' / module, '-o', obj], blog, f'compile {module}')
objects.append(obj)
command(common + ['-fobjc-arc', source / 'tests/fixtures/poison_device.m', *objects,
'-framework', 'UIKit', '-framework', 'Foundation',
'-lobjc', '-o', app / 'IGPoisonPilot'],
blog, 'link app')
shutil.copy2(profile, app / 'embedded.mobileprovision')
allowed = {k: v for k, v in ent.items()
if k not in ('application-identifier', 'keychain-access-groups')}
allowed.update({'application-identifier': prefix + '.' + bundle,
'keychain-access-groups': [prefix + '.' + bundle]})
(output / 'entitlements.plist').write_bytes(plistlib.dumps(allowed))
command(['codesign', '--force', '--sign', identity,
'--entitlements', output / 'entitlements.plist', app], blog, 'sign app')
command(['codesign', '--verify', '--strict', '--verbose=2', app], blog, 'verify app')
(output / 'manifest.json').write_text(json.dumps(
dict(bundle_id=bundle, team=team, profile_name=data['Name'],
source_hashes=hashes, signing='development',
device_validation='not_run'), ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + '\n')
print(app)
if __name__ == '__main__':
p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
p.add_argument('--profile', type=Path, required=True)
p.add_argument('--identity', required=True)
p.add_argument('--bundle-id', required=True)
p.add_argument('--output', type=Path, required=True)
a = p.parse_args()
build(a.profile, a.identity, a.bundle_id, a.output)
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""安装并运行 step12 处置链真机验证诊断 App,收集/解析结果(见 docs/19)。
单相位启动(无需 DYLD 注入)。解析两类输出:
- IG_POISON_CASE:环境无关不变量(D4–D7),构成套件 PASS/FAIL 门槛。
- IG_POISON_OBS / IG_POISON_ENV:环境相关观察(D1–D3 + 越狱判定),供人按
R(非越狱)/J(越狱)组对照 docs/19 §4 验收门槛判定,不参与套件 PASS/FAIL。
结束即卸载诊断 App;全部证据与哈希写入输出目录(必须不存在)。
退出码:套件不变量全过且环境判定与 --expect 一致 → 0;否则 1。
--expect clean|jailbroken|any(默认 any):声明本次所在组的期望环境,便于自动校验
“R 组必须 jailbroken=no、J 组必须 jailbroken=yes”。
"""
import argparse
import hashlib
import json
import re
from pathlib import Path
import subprocess
CASE_RE = re.compile(r'IG_POISON_CASE (\S+) (PASS|FAIL)(?: detail=(.*))?$')
OBS_RE = re.compile(r'IG_POISON_OBS (\S+) (.*)$')
SUITE_RE = re.compile(r'IG_POISON_SUITE (PASS|FAIL) pass=(\d+) fail=(\d+)')
ENV_RE = re.compile(r'IG_POISON_ENV jailbroken=(yes|no) reason400=(\d+) reason401=(\d+)')
def run(args, log: Path, label: str, timeout: int = 240):
r = subprocess.run(list(map(str, args)), capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)
log.write_text(r.stdout + r.stderr)
return r
def parse_console(path: Path):
cases, observations, suite, env = [], [], None, None
for line in path.read_text(errors='replace').splitlines():
m = CASE_RE.search(line)
if m:
cases.append(dict(name=m.group(1), result=m.group(2), detail=m.group(3) or ''))
continue
m = OBS_RE.search(line)
if m:
observations.append(dict(name=m.group(1), detail=m.group(2)))
continue
m = SUITE_RE.search(line)
if m:
suite = dict(result=m.group(1), passed=int(m.group(2)), failed=int(m.group(3)))
continue
m = ENV_RE.search(line)
if m:
env = dict(jailbroken=(m.group(1) == 'yes'),
reason400=int(m.group(2)), reason401=int(m.group(3)))
return cases, observations, suite, env
def main():
p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
p.add_argument('--device', required=True)
p.add_argument('--app', type=Path, required=True)
p.add_argument('--bundle-id', required=True)
p.add_argument('--output', type=Path, required=True)
p.add_argument('--expect', choices=['clean', 'jailbroken', 'any'], default='any',
help='R 组传 clean,J 组传 jailbroken;默认 any 不校验环境')
a = p.parse_args()
out = a.output.resolve()
if out.exists():
raise ValueError('输出目录必须不存在')
out.mkdir(parents=True)
base = ['xcrun', 'devicectl']
r = run(base + ['device', 'info', 'details', '--device', a.device],
out / 'device-details.log', 'device info')
(out / 'device-details.json').write_text(r.stdout)
run(base + ['device', 'install', 'app', '--device', a.device, '--timeout', '60',
'--json-output', out / 'install.json', a.app],
out / 'install.log', 'install')
run(base + ['device', 'process', 'launch', '--device', a.device, '--console', '--timeout', '90',
'--json-output', out / 'launch.json', a.bundle_id],
out / 'console.log', 'launch')
cases, observations, suite, env = parse_console(out / 'console.log')
run(base + ['device', 'uninstall', 'app', '--device', a.device, '--timeout', '60',
'--json-output', out / 'uninstall.json', a.bundle_id],
out / 'uninstall.log', 'uninstall')
failed = [c for c in cases if c['result'] != 'PASS']
invariants_ok = bool(cases) and not failed and suite and suite['result'] == 'PASS'
env_ok = True
env_note = '未校验(--expect any)'
if a.expect != 'any':
if env is None:
env_ok = False
env_note = '未解析到 IG_POISON_ENV'
else:
want = (a.expect == 'jailbroken')
env_ok = (env['jailbroken'] == want)
env_note = (f"期望 {a.expect},实测 jailbroken="
f"{'yes' if env['jailbroken'] else 'no'}"
f"(400={env['reason400']} 401={env['reason401']})")
verdict = 'PASS' if (invariants_ok and env_ok) else 'FAIL'
verification = dict(
device=a.device, bundle_id=a.bundle_id, app=str(a.app), expect=a.expect,
verdict=verdict,
invariant_cases=cases, invariant_suite=suite,
invariants_ok=invariants_ok,
observations=observations, environment=env,
env_check=dict(ok=env_ok, note=env_note),
acceptance_ref='docs/19 §4',
limitations=[
'D1–D3 依赖真实环境:R 组应 jailbroken=no 且 baseline mask=0;J 组应命中 400/401',
'bypass(Shadow/Liberty) 可规避:J 组若装 bypass 未命中不代表探针失效,需分裸越狱/带 bypass 两档记录',
'诊断为独立进程,业务密钥派生端到端效果需接入 readoor 后再验(docs/18 §4)',
])
(out / 'device-verification.json').write_text(
json.dumps(verification, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + '\n')
hashes = {}
for f in sorted(out.rglob('*')):
if f.is_file() and f.name != 'evidence-hashes.json':
hashes[str(f.relative_to(out))] = hashlib.sha256(f.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
(out / 'evidence-hashes.json').write_text(
json.dumps(hashes, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + '\n')
print(json.dumps(dict(verdict=verdict, invariants_ok=invariants_ok,
suite=suite, environment=env, env_check=env_note),
ensure_ascii=False))
raise SystemExit(0 if verdict == 'PASS' else 1)
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()